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In his interesting paper, Martin Hingley makes a few key
observations about power and role accorded to it in the
relationship marketing literature that has become increas-
ingly popular over the past decade. Fundamentally, the
article states that the relationship marketing view sees power
as alien to effective relationships, as negating cooperation,
and as the antithesis of trust. In other words, power in a
relationship is ‘‘only viewed in a negative sense’’. Or,
alternatively, power is viewed as not important enough to
include in relationship marketing models because firms have
moved from transactional exchanges to relational exchange.
It is contended by the relationship marketing literature that
as adversarial and arms-length dealings have been replaced
by close partnerships and long-term commitments, power
(especially power imbalance) has no place in these latter
type of relationships. The article quotes my research as
supporting some of these conclusions.
In this paper I will argue that my conclusions about
power in channel relationships are a bit more nuanced than
the above description. And, my view of power is actually
sympathetic of Hingley’s main thesis that power is central to
channel relationships and that effective partnerships have
both cooperative (positive-sum) and competitive (zero-sum)
dimensions. Furthermore, despite central tendencies favour-
ing the rise of trust and commitment under conditions of
high mutual dependence, it is possible to see trusting
relationships associated with asymmetric power structures.
At the outset, in the interest of full disclosure, I must note
that while the opinions expressed in this paper are mine, they
are based on research that has resulted from close collabo-
rations with several delightful co-authors. My approach here
will be to consider this research as a body and draw
integrated lessons from it rather than do a more sweeping
literature review or a point by point rebuttal of Martin
Hingley’s article. I hope the reader will allow this indulgence.
While the use of the word power is ubiquitous in
everyday language, as a theoretical construct it is messy and
complex concept. It defies easy definition, quick under-
standing of how it works, and clear comprehension of
resulting outcomes. A researcher grappling with power can
therefore easily be trapped into discussing power as it is
applied in everyday conversation. However, this will lead to
erroneous conclusions. To really understand power may take
more than the years available to any of us. Still, based on
my research, here are some conclusions about power and
relationship marketing.
1. Long-term relationships do not imply trust
In the world of manufacturer–retailer relationships, most
relationships between the large retailers and manufacturers
are long-term in the sense that they intend to and will
continue to do business with each other. It’s a fait accompli.
For example, Procter and Gamble or Sara Lee will be
supplying Carrefour and Wal-Mart for the foreseeable
future. And, if that is what is meant by commitment, then
one may conclude these are committed relationships. But
the nature of the underlying commitment is calculative
commitment in the sense that the firms have to continue to
do business with each other. Whether affective (affect
based) or moral (obligation based) commitment exists
between such parties is an entirely different story and
depends on the level of trust and the lack of opportunism
between the parties (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, &
Kumar, 1996; Kumar, Hibbard, & Stern, 1994).
Relationships between powerful retailers and powerful,
albeit relatively less powerful, manufacturers who must
continue to do business with each other may or may not be
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characterized by trust. It depends on how the relatively
powerful retailer behaves. Many manufacturers will contend
that they trust Wal-Mart despite their tough practices
(Kumar, 1996), whilst the same will not be reported about
the manufacturer relationships with Carrefour. With Wal-
Mart, once a deal is done, albeit after hard bargaining, it’s
done. With Carrefour, as a manufacturer rep, you agree on a
deal and just an hour after you have left their office, they
will call you on the mobile phone asking for a wee bit more
concessions.
Not surprisingly, age of the relationship was observed to
be uncorrelated with relationship quality (Kumar, Scheer, &
Steenkamp, 1995a). In other words, long-term relationships
come in many forms: adversarial or cooperative; based on
trust or rife with distrust; and bound together by affective,
calculative and/or moral commitment. It is important to keep
these concepts precise and separate rather than assume them
to be falling in two highly inter-correlated and ill-defined
buckets of transactional versus long-term relationships.
2. Punitive capability and dependence based power are
fundamentally different
When discussing power, the relationship marketing
literature often uses two rather different notions of power
interchangeably. This is responsible for much of the
confusion in the discourse about power because it mixes
apples and oranges. The implications of dependence-based
power for channel relationships are fundamentally different
from those of punitive capability based power (Kumar,
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998).
When a firm possesses resources that generate for its
partner rewards and benefits that cannot be easily replaced,
the partner is dependent on the firm. While the partner’s
dependence gives the firm power over its partner, a firm may
also have resources that do not generate benefits for the
partner but can be used to hurt the partner (Kumar et al.,
1998). Punitive capability is the firm’s ability to inflict
negative consequences on the partner, such as the capability
to file lawsuits against the partner, and this type of power has
a very different flavour from power based on dependence.
The relationship marketing literature sometimes implies
that power negates cooperation and trust. But this depends
on which form of power we are discussing, dependence or
punitive capability, the dyadic structure (symmetric or
asymmetric) of power, and whether power is exercised or
unexercised. It is meaningless to talk about ‘‘power’’, one
needs to be specific on the nature of the power structure and
its conduct.
3. Power versus trust is an incorrect dichotomy
For too long, the dependence based power view implied
that one should not be dependent on the other party as that
would lead them to have power over you. Such a view of
dependence is rather unidimensional as it takes a single
party’s perspective and conceptualizes power as a zero-sum
game—if I become more dependent on you, I become less
powerful. If one adopts it, then the most powerful nations in
the world be North Korea and Myanmar as they do not
depend on other nations but are, by and large, self reliant.
Instead, one becomes powerful by creating a network of
mutual dependencies.
The impact of how dependent the focal party is on the
other party is moderated by how dependent the other party is
on the focal party—or the structure of interdependence
(Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995b). The implications of
mutual high dependence are very different from asymmetric
dependence (one party has power over the other). In high
mutual dependence, it is not clearly based on classical
unidimensional view of power, whether the firm is powerful
as partner is dependent on the firm or powerless as firm is
dependent on the partner.
Furthermore, there are significant differences between
low mutual dependence and high mutual dependence.
Therefore, as is often mistakenly contended, it is not
symmetric versus asymmetric (or balanced versus unbal-
anced) dependence in a relationship that drives the impact of
power structure on trust. In general, there are no differences
on relationship quality between relationships characterized
by asymmetric dependence and those characterized by low
mutual dependence (Kumar et al., 1995b). None of these
three cells inherently perpetuate trust and commitment, only
mutual high dependence generates trust and commitment
(Kumar et al., 1995b). In other words, high mutual
dependence based power is what leads to lower conflict as
well as higher trust and commitment in relationships. Power
is hardly the antithesis of trust.
4. Power structure is an important determinant, but not
everything
While on average, unbalanced dependence structures do
not produce the level of trust and commitment that one
observes in relationships of high mutual dependence, this
does not imply that one cannot observe trust and commit-
ment in asymmetrical relationships. Vulnerable parties can
trust the more powerful party if the latter behaves fairly
(Kumar et al., 1995a). In turn, trust mitigates the negative
effects of interdependence asymmetry on affective commit-
ment (Geyskens et al., 1996).
Fairness perceptions in a relationship are driven by two
relatively independent components—distributive justice and
procedural justice (Kumar et al., 1995a). Distributive justice
is whether a party perceives that the distribution of
outcomes is fair between partners. Procedural justice relates
to whether the processes of the powerful party vis-a´-vis the
vulnerable partners are fair. In asymmetrical relationships,
the powerful party can generate trust and commitment from
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its vulnerable partners if the latter perceive the relationship
as being characterized by distributive and procedural justice.
And, interestingly, procedural justice is more important that
distributive justice in developing trust and commitment
(Kumar, 1996; Kumar et al., 1995a). Parties are therefore
not prisoners of the interdependence structure.
5. The possession of power is different from exercising it
Parties who possess dependence based power or punitive
capability may choose to exercise such power against the
other party through punitive actions and non-coercive
influence tactics. Coercive tactics or punitive actions take
the form of threats (promise to deliver contingent negative
consequences) and punishments (actually delivering the
negative consequences). Non-coercive influence tactics
were generally considered to be promises (contingent
rewards) and other non-contingent approaches such as
information exchange, discussion of business strategies,
and requests.
Relationships with greater total interdependence see
lesser use of punitive actions while relationships with
higher mutual punitive capability see enhanced use of
punitive tactics (Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001; Kumar et
al., 1998). In asymmetric punitive capability based power
relationships, as a party’s punitive capability advantage
increases, the use of punitive actions against the other party
increases. The results from empirical research also consis-
tently demonstrate that use of punitive actions reduces the
other party’s trust and commitment (Geyskens, Steenkamp,
& Kumar, 1998, 1999). Taken as whole, these results imply
that greater mutual dependence based power generate trust
and commitment because of reduced use of punitive actions.
However, greater mutual punitive capability based power as
well as asymmetry in punitive capabilities should reduce
trust and commitment as it enhances the use of punitive
actions. One cannot talk about power as a generic construct
in relation to its impact on relationship quality. The need is
for specificity.
In contrast to punitive actions, the use of non-contingent
approaches by a party increases trust and commitment to the
relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999). While
promises have occasionally been considered a non-coercive
strategy as they potentially deliver benefits and rewards,
meta-analytical results demonstrate that increased use of
promises by a party is negatively correlated with the other
party’s trust (Geyskens et al., 1999). Therefore, promises as
an influence strategy appear to be more at home under
coercive tactics because of its contingent character.
6. Power plays a role in close collaborative relationships
Companies form inter-organizational relationships not to
feel good but in pursuit of value creation that they could not
achieve on their own. Yet, this does change the reality that
business relationships are inherently mixed-motive games.
Regardless, of the marginal value created by the relation-
ship, ultimately, there must be a division of these returns
(Corsten & Kumar, 2005). Distributive justice or fairness of
outcomes dictates that the equity principle determines the
division of returns.
A party experiences equity when it perceives that the
outcomes it and its partner receive from the relationship are
proportional to their respective inputs. If the distribution is
equitable, the party is more likely to demonstrate trust and
commitment to its partner (Scheer, Kumar, & Steenkamp,
2003). Negative inequity, getting less than deserved, incites
hostility while positive inequity, obtaining proportionally
more than one deserves, triggers feelings of guilt. Both
hostility and guilt lead to lower trust and commitment.
However, not all cultures perceive guilt at being over-
compensated, and thereby, see as a consequence lower trust
and commitment (Scheer et al., 2003).
While equitable distributions are preferred, the experi-
ence of Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) indicates that
power matters in the distribution of outcomes from a
relationship. ECR is a major FMCG initiative to build
collaborative relationships 0with powerful retailers and
includes category management within its scope. ECR
adoption in a relationship delivers absolute benefits to both
parties, but powerful retailers tend to capture more of the
gains (Corsten & Kumar, 2005). As a result, suppliers to
powerful retailers perceive greater inequity with higher
levels of collaboration through ECR. However, given the
dependence based and punitive capability based power
imbalance in favour of the retailer, suppliers have little
choice but to accept the higher, but still inequitable, returns
from ECR (Corsten & Kumar, 2003).
7. Final thoughts
In conclusion, I would like to three observations. First,
the relationships literature is quite wide and diverse. As the
discussion of the research above indicates, some of it
integrates power and trust. To select a particular article that
argues power is either irrelevant or the anti-thesis of trust
and make it representative of the entire body of relationship
marketing literature is not fair.
Second, the word power has at least four operationaliza-
tions in the literature: dependence, punitive capability, non-
coercive influence strategies, and punitive actions. Of these
it is really punitive actions that seem, based on research to
date, to be the antithesis of building trusting relationships. It
is my guess that this is the meaning of power that was being
referred to by any particular article that claimed power to be
either irrelevant or only a negative phenomena.
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, no research in the
channel relationships has empirically demonstrated anything
but deleterious effects of punitive actions. Yet, punitive
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actions (threats and punishments) are observed frequently in
all types of relationships—between countries, supervisor–
subordinate, manufacturer–retailer, and even parent–child.
There must be some positive effects of coercive tactics, or at
least under some conditions. Our future research efforts
should be targeted to uncovering this mystery.
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